Turo
The Withdrawn-IPO Deep Dive — three years on file, a $1.7B mark the secondary tape no longer believes, and the last P2P car-sharing marketplace standing.
Turo is the world's largest peer-to-peer car-sharing marketplace — ~$1B of net revenue on ~$3B of gross bookings, 350,000 active vehicle listings, and a category it now owns outright after Getaround and Kyte both collapsed. It is also the most scrutinised private company in mobility: an S-1 that sat on EDGAR for 37 months through 12 amendments before a Form RW withdrawal on February 13, 2025. The filings show why it never priced — growth slowed from 59% to 8%, operating income fell every year after 2021, and the book is U.S.-concentrated and insurance-intensive. The question for 2026 is not "when does Turo list" (EDGAR shows no new filing) but whether a profitable, category-winning marketplace marked at $1.7B by its last preferred issuance and ~$0.8–1.2B by secondary buyers is mis-priced in either direction.
The Numbers at a Glance
1 · Business Overview
Airbnb for cars, sixteen years in
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Founded | 2009 (as RelayRides) · rebranded Turo 2015 |
| CEO / Chair | Andre Haddad (since 2011) |
| HQ | San Francisco, California |
| Employees | 973 full-time (Sept 30, 2024 S-1/A) · ~15% cut April 2025 |
| Markets | United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France (OuiCar), Australia |
| Supply | ~150,000 active hosts · ~350,000 active vehicle listings (Sept 30, 2024) |
| Demand | ~3.5 million active guests · 24.4M Days booked in 2023 |
| Total Raised | ~$523M of primary capital (Series A–E) |
| Last Preferred Mark | $1.7B · Series E-2, Sept 2024 (IAC warrant net-exercise, not new cash) |
| Largest Holder | People Inc. (formerly IAC, NASDAQ: PPLI) · ~33% |
| 2023 Net Revenue (audited) | $879.7M · +18% YoY · 36.5% take on $2.41B GBV |
| 2024 Net Revenue (company-stated) | $958M · +9% YoY |
Turo is a two-sided marketplace: hosts list privately owned cars (from a single Honda to fleets of hundreds run by "Power Hosts"), guests book by the day, and Turo sits in the middle with the payments, the trust-and-safety screening, the Turo Risk Score, and — crucially — the protection plans that make a stranger's car insurable. The S-1 defines the company's unit of volume as a Day (one vehicle-day booked, net of cancellations) and its top-of-funnel as Gross Booking Value; net revenue is the marketplace fee plus protection-plan fees, which is why Turo keeps a far larger share of GBV (~36%) than a travel OTA (~12–15%).
Since 2010 the use case has widened from weekend trips to airport rentals, 7–29 day bookings (~34% of Days in 2023) and monthly stays (≥30 days, ~7%); in October 2025 Turo formally launched a monthly product pitched as "an alternative to leasing", and said 3-month-plus trips were its fastest-growing segment with triple-digit growth through September 2025.
2 · The Filing That Never Priced
37 months on EDGAR, 12 amendments, one withdrawal letter
Most "IPO expected" copy about Turo is recycled from 2022. The record on EDGAR (CIK 1514587) is unambiguous:
| Date | Filing | What it tells you |
|---|---|---|
| Aug 6, 2021 | DRS (confidential) | Draft submitted at the top of the 2021 window |
| Jan 10, 2022 | S-1 (public) | FY2021: $469M revenue, +213%; net loss $40M |
| 2022–2023 | S-1/A ×8 | Kept current through the rate shock; FY2022 rev +59%, FY2023 +18% |
| Mar–Nov 2024 | S-1/A ×4 (No. 9–12) | 9M 2024 revenue +8%; Series E-2 issued to IAC; syndicate led by Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, Allen & Co., Citi |
| Feb 13, 2025 | Form RW | Registration withdrawn. CEO: the IPO "had become a distraction" |
| Feb 2025 → Aug 2026 | Nothing | No DRS, no S-1, no Form D. The 2022 Form D was the last capital-raise notice |
Two months after withdrawing, Turo cut roughly 150 jobs (~15%). Since then the public record shows a company optimising for profitability and supply quality, not a relaunch: a new CMO (David Corns, ex-Opendoor) and the "Cars Are Cool" brand platform in March 2026, "earnings plans" replacing protection plans for hosts from March 31, 2026, a ChatGPT app, and a World Cup host-financing push with Stellantis, Nissan and Rivian. The CFO who ran the IPO process, Charles Fisher, left for Lambda in early 2026; no successor has been announced publicly, which by itself argues against a near-term refiling.
The S-1 amendments documented the deceleration in real time
Turo filed into the last great window and then kept the document alive through the worst one. Each amendment restated the same arc: pandemic-era growth of 213% (2021) and 59% (2022) faded to 18% (2023) and 8% for the first nine months of 2024. Adjusted EBITDA peaked at $81M in 2021 and was $26M for 9M 2024. Public-market buyers in 2024 were paying for either growth or margin; Turo's S-1 offered a decelerating top line and a compressing margin at the same time — at a $1.7B preference stack that investors would have had to clear.
- FY2022 "profit" flattered the optics. The $154.7M net income included a $64.2M tax benefit and a $50.7M warrant-revaluation gain; operating income was $33.8M.
- Supply slipped between amendments. Active hosts / listings went from ~165,000 / 365,000 (June 30, 2024) to ~150,000 / 350,000 (Sept 30, 2024) in successive filings.
- Cash was fine, not abundant. $219M of cash at Sept 30, 2024 against a $558M liquidation preference on the preferred.
3 · Financials & Unit Economics
A billion-dollar marketplace growing high single digits
The last audited numbers are the S-1/A No. 12 (filed Nov 14, 2024). Everything after is company-stated to journalists or hosts and is labelled as such below — there is no verified FY2024 or FY2025 income statement.
| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | 9M 2024 | FY2024* | FY2025* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net revenue | $469.0M | $746.6M | $879.7M | $722.0M | $958M | ~$1.0B |
| Growth | +213% | +59% | +18% | +8% | +9% | n/d |
| Gross Booking Value | $1.26B | $2.06B | $2.41B | $1.98B | n/d | ~$3B |
| Days booked | 10.9M | 19.1M | 24.4M | 20.1M | n/d | n/d |
| Operating income | $46.6M | $33.8M | $13.7M | n/d | n/d | n/d |
| Net income (loss) | ($40.4M) | $154.7M† | $14.7M | $19.4M | n/d | n/d |
| Adjusted EBITDA | $81.1M | $79.7M | $48.8M | $25.6M | n/d | n/d |
| Take rate (rev ÷ GBV) | 37.3% | 36.2% | 36.5% | 36.5% | — | ~33% |
* FY2024 revenue is the figure Haddad gave at withdrawal (TechCrunch, Feb 2025); FY2025 is "recently crossed $1 billion in revenue on roughly $3 billion in gross booking value" (Forbes interview, Oct 2025) — period basis not stated. † FY2022 includes a $64.2M income-tax benefit and a $50.7M warrant gain. n/d = not disclosed. Sources: S-1/A No. 12, Nov 14, 2024.
What the unit economics say. Turo's 36% take is the highest in consumer travel because it includes protection-plan revenue — and protection is also the largest cost. Cost of net revenue is dominated by insurance and claims, trust-and-safety losses, payment processing and host payouts on value-added services; the S-1 warns at length that claims reserves "may be inadequate" and that carriers (Travelers in the U.S.) have raised premiums and deductibles. The company was still net-income positive in 2023 and 9M 2024 (the latter helped by a warrant gain), and adjusted-EBITDA positive every year since 2021 — rare for a marketplace at this scale — but the margin trend ran the wrong way: adj. EBITDA fell from 17% of revenue (2021) to 5.5% (2023) and 3.5% (9M 2024).
- Geography is the hidden concentration. The U.S. was 91% of 2023 net revenue ($796.7M of $879.7M); international (Canada, UK, France, Australia) was $83M and shrank in 9M 2024 ($63.2M vs $68.4M).
- Marketing is restrained. Sales & marketing was $100.5M for 9M 2024, +2% YoY — Turo grew Days 9% on flat marketing, the clearest evidence of organic demand.
- Supply is the constraint, not demand. The 2026 playbook — host financing, OEM discounts, "earnings plans" tied to booking lead time — is all about getting more cars listed for the World Cup summer.
4 · Valuation Marks & the Secondary Tape
$1.7B on paper, ~$0.8–1.2B where shares actually change hands
Turo has not raised primary capital since the Series E in February 2020 ($280M at ~$1.24B post-money). The headline "$1.7B" mark comes from the Series E-2 issued to IAC in August 2024 when IAC net-exercised a warrant — 4.49M preferred shares carrying a $13.35 liquidation preference, not a new cash round. That distinction matters: nobody wrote a cheque at $1.7B.
Two secondary venues disagree by ~48% on price — Forge's indicative $8.65 (itself down 20% from the prior print) against Hiive's $5.84 — which is what a thin, one-sided market looks like. On the S-1/A share base (113M basic; ~138M with options at $8.72 and liquidity-vesting RSUs) those prints imply $0.8–1.2B fully diluted, i.e. 0.8–1.2× 2025 revenue. Even the Forge print sits below the 2020 Series E. QuantLogix's own secondary overlay carried a $5.27 indication in late June 2026, down 33% over twelve months.
People Inc. (PPLI) owns ~33% — and carries it at cost
IAC — renamed People Incorporated and re-tickered PPLI on June 4, 2026 — reported owning "approximately 33%" of Turo at December 31, 2025, March 31, 2026 and June 30, 2026. It holds the stake under the ASC 321 measurement alternative (cost, adjusted only for impairments or observable transactions), inside a line of "equity securities without readily determinable fair values" that stood at $404.6M at June 30, 2026 (from $438.5M at end-2024). Turo is the largest holding in that line but is not broken out. Read carefully: that carrying value says nothing about what IAC thinks Turo is worth today — but it does mean a down-round or secondary at the Hiive print would force a mark on PPLI's balance sheet. IAC's Joey Levin and Mark Stein both sit on Turo's board; IAC also holds the junior "Series 1" preferred created in July 2024. The listed-company exposure to Turo runs through PPLI, not through any mobility stock.
5 · Competitive Landscape
Last marketplace standing — against fleets that never left
The pure-play competitive set has been eliminated. Getaround (the SPAC-listed #2) wound down U.S. operations in February 2025, sold its European business to GoMore for ~€31.5M, and in June 2026 its board voted to dissolve and liquidate. Kyte, the delivered-rental startup that "billed itself as the best competitor to Hertz", sold its customer list to Turo in July 2025 and entered receivership a month later. Uber shut Uber Carshare in Australia and redirected users to Turo. In P2P, Turo now competes with no one at scale.
What it competes with is the $38–65B U.S. rental industry (the lower figure is rental only; the higher includes leasing) — Enterprise, Hertz and Avis — where Haddad puts Turo's share at ~6% and calls the other 94% "incredible opportunity". Those incumbents are not building P2P marketplaces; they are moving the other way, into fleet services for robotaxis (Hertz "Oro Mobility" with Uber, April 2026; Avis's Waymo fleet-ops deal in Dallas) and premium airport tiers (Avis First). The more interesting frenemy is Uber, which has listed Turo inventory inside Uber Rent since 2025 (U.S. ex-OR/NY/WA, UK, Canada, Australia, France) — a distribution channel today, an aggregator risk tomorrow.
| Company | Ticker | Model | Market Cap | FY2024 Revenue | Cap ÷ Rev | QL Signal |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Turo | Private | P2P car-sharing marketplace | $0.8–1.7B | $958M* | 0.8–1.8× | — |
| Airbnb | ABNB | P2P lodging marketplace | $109B | $11.1B | 9.8× | Buy |
| Uber | UBER | Mobility platform · Uber Rent partner | $160B | $44.0B | 3.6× | Buy |
| Booking Holdings | BKNG | OTA incl. rental-car GDS | $158B | $23.7B | 6.6× | Buy |
| Expedia | EXPE | OTA | $39B | $13.7B | 2.8× | Buy |
| Avis Budget (Zipcar) | CAR | Owned fleet | $5.1B | $11.8B | 0.43× | Buy |
| Hertz | HTZ | Owned fleet | $0.7B | $9.0B | 0.08× | Neutral |
| Lyft | LYFT | Rideshare | $6.6B | $5.8B | 1.1× | Sell |
Market caps and QL signals from the QuantLogix stock universe, Aug 22, 2026; revenue is each company's reported FY2024 (last full year common to all); ratio is market cap ÷ revenue, not enterprise value. * Turo FY2024 is company-stated.
6 · Insurance, Liability & the 2025 Shock
The protection business is the moat and the exposure
Turo's economics rest on a stack of carriers it does not control: Travelers Excess & Surplus Lines in the U.S., Economical in Canada, Aioi Nissay Dowa (via Aon) in the UK, Baloise in France, and a discretionary mutual in Australia. On New Year's Day 2025 both the New Orleans Bourbon Street attack vehicle and the Las Vegas Cybertruck were Turo rentals. Victims' counsel sued in Orleans Parish within the month and, by early 2026, were suing Travelers as Turo's underwriter; a separate Texas federal case (Lawal v. Turo) alleges insurance-claim and arbitration abuses. None of these has produced a ruling that changes the model — but they landed while the S-1 was live, and the withdrawal followed six weeks later.
The regulatory tape since has mostly moved Turo's way:
- New York cut the P2P minimum liability from $1.25M to $75K/$150K in December 2025 (Turo spent $435K on Albany lobbying in 2025) — the single biggest cost-of-coverage relief in its largest un-entered market.
- Maryland HB 1186 (effective Oct 1, 2026) bars insurers from non-renewing owners who list on P2P platforms and shifts primary-liability triggers onto the platform — good for supply, a watch-item for claims cost.
- North Carolina applies a new gross-receipts tax to P2P platforms from Oct 1, 2026 — the kind of state-by-state tax parity fleets have lobbied for since 2019.
- Federal: roughly 30 states extend Graves-Amendment-style vicarious-liability protection to P2P; a federal codification is being pushed into surface-transportation reauthorisation. If it passes, the largest legal tail risk in the S-1 shrinks materially.
7 · Valuation Framework
Marketplace multiple or fleet multiple?
| Metric | At $1.7B (E-2 mark) | At ~$1.0B (Forge-implied) | Comp |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 revenue (stated) | ~$1.0B | ~$1.0B | — |
| Value ÷ revenue | ~1.7× | ~1.0× | ABNB 9.8× · EXPE 2.8× · CAR 0.43× |
| Value ÷ GBV | ~0.57× | ~0.33× | ABNB ~1.3× · BKNG ~0.9× |
| Revenue growth | ~8–9% | ~8–9% | ABNB ~12% · EXPE ~7% · CAR flat |
| Adj. EBITDA margin (last audited) | 3.5% (9M24) | 3.5% (9M24) | ABNB ~35% · CAR ~5% (adj. EBITDA) |
| Profitability | Net income positive 2022–9M24 | Same | — |
The market's verdict is visible in the gap between the two Turo bars. A marketplace growing 30% with 20%+ EBITDA margins earns an Airbnb-style multiple; a capital-light intermediary growing 8% with mid-single-digit margins earns an Expedia multiple at best — and the secondary tape is pricing Turo below Expedia, closer to Lyft. Fair-value triangulation on ~$1.0B of 2025 revenue:
- Bull case ($2.0–2.5B · 2–2.5×): monthly/"lease alternative" and World Cup supply re-accelerate growth to mid-teens, adj. EBITDA margin rebuilds toward 10%, federal Graves-style liability protection passes, and a 2027 refiling clears the $558M preference stack comfortably. Requires a new CFO and a clean FY2025–26 audit.
- Base case ($1.0–1.4B · 1–1.4×): high-single-digit growth, flat margins, no filing; value accrues to PPLI's balance sheet and to employees via periodic tenders. This is roughly where Forge has it.
- Bear case ($0.5–0.8B · 0.5–0.8×): insurance-loss inflation or an adverse liability ruling compresses the take rate, Uber Rent turns from channel into aggregator, and a recapitalisation prices below the 2020 Series E — the Hiive print.
8 · Key Risks
What a 2027 S-1 would have to answer
| Risk | Severity | Mitigant |
|---|---|---|
| No liquidity event | High | No filing since Feb 2025; CFO seat vacant publicly; PPLI has no forced-seller timeline |
| Growth stuck at high single digits | High | Monthly rentals + Uber Rent distribution + 2026 supply push are the re-acceleration bets |
| Insurance / claims cost inflation | High | Carrier diversification across five countries; NY liability cut; Graves-style protections spreading |
| Liability litigation (Jan 1, 2025 attacks) | Medium | Suits target Travelers as underwriter; no adverse ruling to date |
| U.S. concentration (91% of revenue) | Medium | International shrank in 2024; UK draws 20% of bookings from Americans |
| Channel dependence on Uber | Medium | Multi-year deal; Turo retains pricing and host relationship |
| Preference overhang ($558M) | Medium | Single-class common; preferences convert 1:1 at IPO, but a down-round triggers them |
| State tax / regulatory patchwork | Low | NC tax and MD rules are costs, not existential; trend is toward parity not bans |
9 · Pre-IPO Exposure Routes Today
One listed proxy, two thin secondary venues
| Route | How | Caveats |
|---|---|---|
| PPLI | People Inc. (ex-IAC) owns ~33% of Turo | Turo is a minority of PPLI's value (Dotdash Meredith, Care.com, Angi stake); carried at cost |
| Private secondaries (Forge, Hiive) | Common / preferred from employees and early holders | Accredited only · $5.84 vs $8.65 venue spread · ROFR and transfer limits |
| Host economics | List a vehicle — the only "retail" participation in Turo's GBV | Operating exposure, not equity |
| ABNB (comp, long) | The marketplace multiple Turo would aspire to | Lodging, not mobility; 10× larger |
| Patience | Wait for a DRS / S-1 on EDGAR | Nothing filed since Feb 2025 — set a filing alert rather than a reminder |
Bottom Line
Turo won its category and lost its window. The business is real — ~$1B of revenue, ~$3B of bookings, profitable on a GAAP basis, with every direct competitor gone — but the S-1 it kept alive for 37 months documented a marketplace decelerating into high-single-digit growth with a shrinking margin, and in February 2025 it stopped pretending otherwise. There is no filing on EDGAR today, the CFO who ran the process has left, and the secondary tape marks the equity at roughly half the $1.7B paper mark. For investors, the honest framing is a value-and-optionality trade: at ~1× revenue the Hiive print already discounts a fleet-like future, and any of three catalysts — a new CFO, a re-accelerating monthly product, or federal liability protection — could reopen the marketplace-multiple argument. Until one of them shows up in a filing, PPLI is the only liquid way to own it, and the right posture on Turo itself is a filing alert, not a position.