Oura
The S-1 Is Public — $1.42B trailing revenue, 5.0 million paying members, and the first wearable to reach the Nasdaq door with profits already on the page.
Oura is the rare consumer-hardware company that earned the right to list. It filed a public Form S-1 on September 3, 2026 for a Nasdaq listing under OURA, disclosing $1.21B of revenue for the nine months to June 30 (+74%) and $60.8M of net income against $1.6M a year earlier. The model is the whole argument: a ring sold at roughly break-even unit economics that installs a subscription with ~85% twelve-month retention — 5.0 million Paid Members, up from 2.5 million. The bear case is equally legible. Gross margin fell from 65% in fiscal 2024 to 55%, one product line is substantially all of revenue, components and manufacturing sit in tariff-exposed Asia, and the competitors are Apple, Samsung and Google. No price range exists yet — the S-1 leaves it blank, so every valuation number in circulation is press, not prospectus.
The Numbers at a Glance
What Oura Actually Sells
A titanium ring that reads the body continuously — sleep, activity, heart-rate variability, temperature, stress — and a paid membership that turns those signals into scores, trends and advice. The hardware is the acquisition channel; the membership is the business.
The S-1 states it in the company's own words: an integrated hardware-plus-membership model that combines strong upfront unit economics with recurring, high-margin subscription revenue, where hardware sales are designed to offset customer acquisition costs at the point of purchase. That single sentence is the reason this filing reads differently from a decade of consumer-hardware IPOs. Oura is not trying to make money selling devices. It is buying subscribers at roughly zero net acquisition cost and monetising them for years.
The installed base is compounding on both sides of that equation. Rings Sold went from 1.0 million in fiscal 2024 to 2.3 million in fiscal 2025 to 3.1 million in the first nine months of fiscal 2026 alone. Paid Members went 1.3 million → 2.9 million → 5.0 million at June 30, 2026. The company puts its share of the smart-ring category at roughly 2% penetration on 3.6 million rings sold over the last year, citing IDC, and says 33% of new members report Oura as their first wearable device — it is expanding the market as much as taking share within it.
Wholesale grew 221% in a year — and that is a margin story, not just a volume one
Fiscal 2025 revenue split $554.5M direct-to-consumer and $353.3M wholesale, against $296.6M and $110.1M in fiscal 2024. DTC grew 87%; wholesale grew 221%. Retail shelves buy reach and lower acquisition cost, but they take margin and they concentrate risk — the S-1 lists reliance on a limited number of retail partners and corporate and enterprise customers as a named risk factor. The 65%-to-55% gross-margin path is partly this mix shift, and the trajectory of wholesale share is the single cleanest thing to watch in the first few public quarters.
Where the Moat Is — and Where It Isn't
The defensible asset is not the ring. Anyone can build a ring; Samsung did. The asset is a decade of longitudinal, real-world biometric data and the models trained on it. The S-1 describes proprietary health foundation models — pre-trained neural networks built on more than ten years of continuous signal — that generate the predictive algorithms behind the scores members actually open the app for.
On top of that sits Oura Advisor, the conversational layer that interprets a member's own data and now handles meal logging by photo. Around it, an ecosystem the company did not have to build: a direct integration with Dexcom's Stelo glucose biosensor, presenting glucose alongside sleep, activity, stress and meal timing, and Natural Cycles for cycle-based family planning. Dexcom is also an investor. These partnerships push Oura from a wellness tracker toward a health platform — and drag it toward regulation.
That is the trade. The S-1 is explicit that certain features are regulated as medical devices, that partner features carry their own marketing authorisations, and that new capabilities are expected to fall under FDA and comparable oversight. Every step up the clinical ladder buys credibility and costs speed: 510(k) clearance, or the far heavier PMA pathway, on a product line that currently ships new features at consumer cadence.
What is not a moat: the form factor, the price point, or the retail shelf. Apple, Samsung and Google can each ship a competent ring and bundle it into an ecosystem Oura cannot match. Oura's answer has to be that the data and the model are better, and that members stay. So far the retention number supports it.
The Real Financials, From the Filing
Fiscal years end September 30. Everything below is from the S-1's audited and interim statements, in thousands of dollars where marked.
| Metric | FY2024 | FY2025 | 9M to Jun 2025 | 9M to Jun 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $406.8M | $907.9M | $697.6M | $1,214.5M |
| Growth (YoY) | — | +123% | — | +74% |
| Cost of revenue | $142.7M | $436.8M | $341.5M | $552.3M |
| Gross profit | $264.1M | $471.0M | $356.0M | $662.2M |
| Gross margin | 65% | 52% | 51% | 55% |
| Sales & marketing | — | $202.2M | $140.3M | $257.9M |
| Research & development | — | $142.0M | $101.1M | $206.8M |
| General & administrative | — | $81.5M | $54.4M | $126.3M |
| Net income | $3.6M | $0.01M | $1.6M | $60.8M |
| Adjusted EBITDA | — | — | $83.5M | $106.7M |
| Rings Sold | 1.0M | 2.3M | 1.8M | 3.1M |
| Paid Members | 1.3M | 2.9M | 2.5M | 5.0M |
Three things stand out. First, the gross-margin round trip: 65% → 52% → 55%. Fiscal 2025 absorbed the Ring 4 ramp, a wholesale surge and inventory charges; the nine-month 2026 number is recovering, not recovered. Second, operating leverage is real but young — revenue grew 74% while S&M grew 84%, R&D grew 105% and G&A grew 132%. Oura is still buying growth, and the profit line is thin enough that a bad quarter erases it. Third, Adjusted EBITDA grew only 28% while net income grew 39x, which tells you how much of the GAAP swing sits below the EBITDA line.
"We have a history of operating losses and have only recently achieved profitability."
Net income by year: $3.6M in fiscal 2024, $0.01 million in fiscal 2025, $60.8M in the nine months to June 2026. That fiscal-2025 figure — twelve thousand dollars on nine hundred million of revenue — is the honest picture of how narrow this business was twelve months ago. The 2026 profit is a genuine inflection, and it is one inflection, not a track record.
IPO Status — Filed, Not Priced
The filing trail on EDGAR is unambiguous, and it is the part of this story most coverage gets wrong by a season. Oura Inc., a Delaware corporation at 415 Kearny Street, San Francisco, SEC CIK 0002133022:
| Date | Form | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| May 19, 2026 | DRS | Confidential draft registration statement — the "confidentially filed" headlines |
| Jun 30, 2026 | DRS/A | First confidential amendment (SEC comment cycle) |
| Jul 27, 2026 | DRS/A | Second |
| Aug 18, 2026 | DRS/A | Third |
| Sep 3, 2026 | S-1 | Public filing, file no. 333-298734 — the financials above became public here |
Terms disclosed: Nasdaq Global Select Market, symbol OURA. Underwriters Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, Allen & Company and BofA Securities. Oura is an emerging growth company under the JOBS Act and will use reduced reporting. There are selling stockholders in the deal — existing holders taking money off the table alongside the primary raise — and a directed share program. At closing, preferred converts, SAFEs convert and RSUs net-settle.
No price. No deal size. No valuation. Anywhere.
The S-1's price range reads "between $ and $ ." Widely repeated figures of up to $3 billion raised at up to $16 billion are press reporting, not prospectus disclosure, and should be treated as such until an S-1/A carries a range. The only company-anchored valuation is the ~$11 billion Series E of more than $900 million in October 2025, led by Fidelity Management & Research with ICONIQ new alongside Whale Rock and Atreides. As of this writing no S-1/A has been filed, which means no roadshow range and no date.
One structural note worth more than it usually gets: the prospectus describes a single class of common stock. No dual-class, no founder supervoting. For a founder-led consumer company in 2026 that is genuinely unusual, and it materially changes the governance discount a public buyer should apply.
Competitive Landscape
The S-1 frames competition in three buckets: broad consumer-electronics companies selling general-purpose smartwatches and trackers; performance-oriented or category-specific wearables; and software-only health companies selling device-agnostic insight. Oura is squeezed by all three, and its defence differs against each.
| Competitor | Type | Scale | QL Signal | Pressure on Oura |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apple | Public · AAPL | $4.85T cap | Buy | Bundles health into a device people already own; Watch is the default |
| Alphabet (Fitbit) | Public · GOOGL | $4.14T cap | Neutral | Distribution and Android integration; has under-invested in the category |
| Garmin | Public · GRMN | $54.5B cap | Underweight | Owns the endurance-athlete niche with no subscription dependency |
| Dexcom | Public · DXCM | $31.3B cap | Underweight | Partner and investor today — a competitor the day glucose goes mainstream |
| Samsung | Public · KRX | Galaxy Ring | n/a | The direct form-factor attack, bundled into a phone ecosystem |
| Whoop | Private | Subscription-only | n/a | The closest model analogue; no hardware margin to defend |
| Ultrahuman | Private | Smart ring | n/a | Price-aggressive direct substitute |
Oura's real advantage over Apple is not the sensor. It is that nobody wears a watch to bed for a week, and everybody wears a ring for a year.
Market caps and QL signals above are QuantLogix's own universe data as of this writing. Note that the three listed comps closest to Oura's business model — Garmin, Dexcom and Peloton — all carry Underweight signals. The market is not currently paying up for consumer health hardware, which is precisely the tape Oura has chosen to list into.
Valuation Framework
Trailing-twelve-month revenue through June 30, 2026 is $1.42 billion — fiscal 2025's $907.9M plus the nine months to June 2026 less the nine months to June 2025. Against that base:
| Company | Value | Revenue | Multiple | Growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oura — at reported $16B target | $16.0B | $1.42B | 11.2x | +74% |
| Oura — at $11B private mark | $11.0B | $1.42B | 7.7x | +74% |
| Dexcom | $31.3B | $4.66B | 6.7x | +16% |
| Sonos | $1.79B | $1.44B | 1.2x | −5% |
| Peloton | $2.17B | $2.45B | 0.9x | −2% |
The spread is the whole argument. At the reported $16B, Oura would price at 11.2x trailing revenue — roughly 1.7x Dexcom's multiple on roughly 4.6x Dexcom's growth rate. That is not obviously wrong. Growth-adjusted, 11.2x on 74% is cheaper than 6.7x on 16%.
The problem is what the comps below it say about the exit. Sonos and Peloton are both consumer-hardware companies with subscription ambitions that the market has repriced to roughly one times revenue. That is the floor case if growth decelerates and the membership attach rate stalls — and it is a 90% drawdown from $16B, not a 30% one. The distance between 11.2x and 1.0x is the risk in this deal, and no amount of current momentum closes it.
What has to stay true for $16B to look cheap in three years
Revenue roughly $2.0B in fiscal 2026 and growing 40%+ into fiscal 2027; gross margin back above 60% as the Ring 4 ramp anniversaries and wholesale mix stabilises; Paid Members past 8 million with retention holding near 85%; and international above 30% of hardware revenue, from under 20% today. Miss two of those and the multiple compresses toward the Dexcom line. Miss all four and the Sonos comparison stops being a joke.
Risk Matrix
| Risk | Severity | What the filing actually says |
|---|---|---|
| Single-product concentration | High | Named first among risk factors: dependence on sales of Oura Ring and Oura Membership subscriptions for substantially all revenue. There is no second line of business. |
| Tariffs and Asian supply chain | High | Components sourced and some manufacturing performed in Asia; the S-1 cites "significant uncertainty about the future of trade relationships" and potential duties raising product cost directly. |
| Big-tech competition | High | Explicitly against "larger companies with greater resources, brand recognition, distribution capabilities, and track record of technology innovation." Samsung already ships a ring. |
| Gross-margin trajectory | Medium | 65% (FY24) → 52% (FY25) → 55% (9M FY26). Driven by product mix, the Ring 4 ramp including battery issues on certain cohorts, wholesale growth and inventory charges. |
| Retail partner concentration | Medium | Reliance on a limited number of retail partners and corporate/enterprise customers, against wholesale that grew 221% year over year. |
| FDA / medical-device creep | Medium | Certain features are already regulated as medical devices; the company expects more to be. 510(k) or PMA pathways slow the feature cadence the brand is built on. |
| Thin, new profitability | Medium | Company's own words: a history of operating losses, profitability only recently achieved, opex expected to increase, no assurance it is maintained. |
| Discretionary consumer spend | Medium | Named risk: reduced consumer discretionary spending on premium-priced products. A ~$350 ring plus a subscription is a cancellable purchase. |
| Geographic concentration | Low | Under 20% of hardware revenue outside the US — a risk today and the clearest growth lever tomorrow. |
How to Get Exposure
Unlike a perpetually-private name, Oura's exposure question has a near-term answer: wait for the deal. A filed S-1 with five bulge-bracket underwriters puts a tradeable listing within a plausible quarter or two of the next amendment. The interesting work between now and then is not access, it is homework.
| Route | Availability | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| IPO allocation | Broker-dependent | Goldman, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, Allen & Co and BofA lead. A directed share program is disclosed; retail access will run through participating brokers' IPO programs. |
| Aftermarket | Open at listing | Nasdaq: OURA. No lockup on new buyers; expect the usual 180-day insider lockup expiry as a supply event to diarise. |
| Secondary pre-IPO | Closing window | Private marketplaces price against the ~$11B Series E. Once a range is filed, private bids typically converge to it and the spread disappears. |
| Public proxies | Imperfect | DXCM is the only listed name with real exposure (investor plus Stelo integration), and it is a rounding error on Dexcom's own P&L. There is no clean proxy. |
Bottom Line
Oura arrives at the Nasdaq door with the thing most consumer-hardware IPOs never had: a subscription that retains at ~85%, 5 million people paying for it, and a profit line. Revenue of $1.21B in nine months at +74%, net income of $60.8M against $1.6M, and a founder-free single-class capital structure make this a fundamentally cleaner filing than the wearables cohort that preceded it. But the price is not set, the $16B figure is press rather than prospectus, and the two closest listed analogues on business model — Sonos and Peloton — trade at roughly one times revenue after their own subscription stories stalled. The bull case needs gross margin back above 60% and international past 30% of hardware revenue; the bear case needs only one soft holiday quarter and a Samsung price cut. Watch for the S-1/A: the first filed range converts this from an interesting document into a decision. Until then it is the best-prepared wearables IPO anyone has filed, listing into a tape that currently marks every one of its public comps Underweight.